The Era of Covert Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Operations Has Arrived
Insights from the 2025 CSIS Space Threat Assessment
The 2025 Space Threat Assessment from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) highlights a critical shift: space threats are no longer theoretical—they’re tactical rehearsals, disguised as routine maneuvers.
What’s unfolding in orbit mirrors earlier shifts in the air and maritime domains: ambiguous behavior, gray zone operations, and the erosion of clear deterrence thresholds.
China’s SJ-25
Launched in January 2025, publicly described as a satellite fuel-replenishment test. But its behavior suggested otherwise:
It entered coplanar orbit with SJ-21, China’s known grappling satellite that previously relocated another satellite in geostationary orbit.
It maneuvered close to TJS-3, a suspected Chinese inspector satellite.
Together, these maneuvers resemble a refueling and orbital manipulation test chain — or more seriously, a covert demonstration of counterspace capabilities. All executed without direct conflict, visible damage, or attribution.
Russia’s Cosmos 2576
Launched in May 2024, with minimal public attention:
It shadowed USA 314, a classified satellite operated by the United States government.
It maintained a synchronized orbit — a tactic used in previous Russian proximity operations.
It later maneuvered away, possibly in response to being tracked.
This pattern echoes Russia’s past anti-satellite behaviors in 2019 and 2022, reinforcing a strategy of presence-based deterrence using orbital ambiguity rather than kinetic action.
Why it matters:
The 2025 Space Threat Assessment reveals a broader doctrinal shift:
Orbital maneuvering is replacing missile testing as the demonstration of capability
Dual-use satellites are being optimized for deception, denial, and deterrence
Attribution is becoming more difficult — often delayed until consequences are irreversible
Terms worth understanding:
Anti-Satellite (ASAT) systems – technologies designed to degrade, disrupt, or destroy space assets; these include kinetic interceptors, directed energy weapons, cyber tools, and increasingly, maneuver-based capabilities disguised as routine operations.
Grapplers – satellites that can physically capture or reposition other spacecraft, often under the guise of servicing or debris removal.
Spoofers – electronic warfare tools that broadcast false GPS (Global Positioning System) or SATCOM (satellite communications) signals to disrupt navigation and communications.
Directed energy weapons – systems such as lasers or high-powered microwaves that can blind, degrade, or disable satellite sensors without direct impact.
Proximity operations – close orbital maneuvers that simulate targeting, inspection, or harassment; often a prelude to operational testing or intimidation.
These systems can be disguised as commercial, civilian, or experimental, operating quietly within the bounds of plausible deniability — but with clear strategic implications.
This is not about testing weapons.
It’s about reshaping deterrence in orbit.
In this environment, foresight must evolve—not to predict what’s next, but to interpret the invisible shifts already underway.
Space is no longer just contested.
It’s being quietly, systematically shaped as a domain of confrontation.
